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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, two months after having a portion of his brain re-
moved due to an accident at the sawmill where he worked,
Cecil Clayton checked himself into a mental hospital, fright-
ened by his suddenly uncontrollable temper.
Previously, Clayton had been an intelligent, guitar-playing
family man, relatives said. He abstained from alcohol, worked
part time as a pastor and paid weekly visits to a local nursing
home.
* Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, R.B. Price Professor of Law,
University of Missouri School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Jane Moriarty and the
members of the Duquesne Law Review for inviting me to participate in such an excellent
event, and many thanks to the Law Review's staff for helpful edits. I am also very grateful
to Dr. Christopher Graver for an extremely illuminating and valuable conversation about the
effects of traumatic brain injuries.
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But after the accident, which necessitated the removal of 20
percent of his frontal lobe, everything changed.
"He broke up with his wife, began drinking alcohol and became
impatient, unable to work and more prone to violent out-
bursts," Clayton's brother Marvin testified at trial.
In 1979, he visited William Clary, a doctor who examined him
for extreme anxiety, depression and paranoia.
"I can't get ahold of myself, I'm all tore up," Clayton told the
doctor, according to court filings from his attorneys.
Clayton's spiraling mental state and increasingly violent be-
havior came to a head in 1996, when he shot and killed Chris-
topher Castetter, a sheriffs deputy responding to a domestic
disturbance between Clayton and his girlfriend. Clayton was
eventually convicted of murder, and executed via lethal injec-
tion in Bonne Terre, Mo.'
Cecil Clayton's story is reminiscent of Phineas Gage's alleged
saga, familiar to any student of neuroscience: A severe traumatic
brain injury transformed him from a well-functioning member of
society into an impulsive, anti-social person.2 Clayton's brain in-
jury and its psychological effects were the basis for numerous legal
claims throughout his capital litigation. He argued at trial that he
could not form the required mens rea for first-degree murder, main-
taining that he could not deliberate.3 He argued in the sentencing
phase that his brain injury should be given great mitigating
weight.4 On post-conviction, he claimed that trial counsel should
have urged that he was incompetent to stand trial.5 In his federal
habeas petition, he argued that counsel should have argued that he
was insane at the time of the offense.6 Moreover, he argued7 he was
1. Sarah Kaplan, The Execution of Cecil Clayton and the Biology of Blame, WASH. POST
(Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/03/18/the-ex-
ecution-of-cecil-clayton-and-the-biology-of-blame/?utmterm=.f3892e80b37c.
2. See Sam Kean, Phineas Gage, Neuroscience's Most Famous Patient, SLATE.COM (May
6, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/health andscience/sci-
ence/2014/05/phineas-gage n urosciencecase true-story of famousfrontal lobe-pa-
tient.html.
3. State ex rel. Clayton v. Griffith, 457 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Mo. 2015).
4. Id.
5. Id.




ineligible for execution under Atkins v. Virginias and otherwise
was incompetent for execution under Ford v. Wainwright.9 The
breadth of these claims relating to his injury, presented at different
stages of litigation, is why one reporter wrote, "[Clayton's] death
brought an end to nearly two decades of litigation during which it
seemed that Clayton's brain, rather than the man himself, was on
trial."10
Traumatic brain injury (TBI), particularly in severe cases, can
have such extraordinary effects on one's psychological capacities
that it may be relevant to many kinds of legal claims in criminal
proceedings. The focus of this essay is on claims related to an
agent's status as a responsible agent. In other words, this essay
will discuss the relationship between traumatic brain injury and
claims that an individual does not have the capacities required to
be fairly held accountable for wrongful actions. The law may hold
most adults fully responsible for their crimes, but it may not hold
responsible young children and the insane. The insanity claim
(which Clayton argued his trial attorneys should have raised) as-
serts that the defendant lacked the capacities required for the state
to hold him responsible for his wrongdoing. Clayton's attorney ar-
gued that it was unfair to hold him responsible, maintaining that
the accident "left him blameless" for the murder he committed. In
a statement released after his execution, she mphasized that "Mr.
Clayton was not a 'criminal' before the sawmill accident," arguing
that he that accident "left him blameless"" for the homicide he com-
mitted because "20 percent of his frontal lobe [was] removed."12
Also, during the penalty phase, arguing that his injury was miti-
gating, Clayton's counsel urged that his capacities required for full
responsibility were diminished, and, therefore, he should not re-
ceive the harshest sentence that could be justified for a fully respon-
sible individual.
In this contribution to a symposium on the important topic of
traumatic brain injury and law, I focus on the following question:
What is the relationship between traumatic brain injury and re-
sponsibility? How does, or how might, a traumatic brain injury af-
fect one's status as a responsible agent?
8. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars execution of persons
with mental retardation).
9. 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars execution of persons
who are insane).
10. Kaplan, supra note 1.
11. State ex rel. Clayton, supra note 3, at 737; Kaplan, supra note 1.
12. Kaplan, supra note 1.
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Clayton's severe brain injury is relevant to his responsibility sta-
tus, but why? What is the basis of his attorney's claim? It can be
interpreted in multiple ways: (1) his injured brain, not Clayton, is
responsible for his crime; (2) though Clayton did commit the crime,
he did not have free will given that his actions were caused by his
brain injury, which was outside his control; (3) the injury caused
cognitive impairments such that he could not act rationally; (4) the
injury impaired his volitional capacities such that he had too much
difficulty controlling his emotions and impulses; or (5) the injury
caused such an extreme personality change that the person who ex-
isted after the injury was no longer Cecil Clayton.
One aim of this essay is to examine the plausibility of each inter-
pretation of his attorney's claim. In doing so, this essay will discuss
the ways in which a traumatic brain injury may be relevant to as-
sessing a person's responsibility status. In this discussion, I will
emphasize a point previously made: The fact that a brain injury
caused an agent to commit a criminal or immoral act that he would
not have otherwise committed is not, by itself, relevant to criminal
responsibility. A corollary to that claim is that neuroscientific find-
ings are irrelevant to responsibility insofar as they are offered to
show that one's brain caused his wrongful act. Traumatic brain in-
jury may be relevant to criminal responsibility depending on the
rationality impairments it causes. Rationality impairments, if se-
rious enough, undermine or diminish criminal responsibility.
To examine the plausibility of each interpretation of his attor-
ney's claim, we need to answer another question: In claiming that
Clayton was not responsible or blameworthy for his wrongdoing,
was she relying on standards of moral responsibility or criminal re-
sponsibility? Of course, in asking that question, we need to know
whether the standards for moral responsibility and criminal re-
sponsibility are the same or diverge in some way. Literature on
criminal law often assumes that the criteria for legal responsibility
mimic the criteria for moral responsibility.
However, reflection upon traumatic brain injury cases reveals at
least some divergence between the criteria for moral responsibility
and those for criminal responsibility. Accordingly, a second aim of
this essay is to highlight this divergence. In short, there may be
cases for which ordinary moral intuitions would permit an excuse
from responsibility although the law does not, and should not, rec-
ognize. Those cases are ones in which a severe brain injury causes
a significant personality change though it does not cause psycholog-
ical impairments serious enough to qualify for insanity. The differ-
38 Vol. 56
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ence in significance between judgments of moral blame and crimi-
nal liability underscores this divergence in responsibility criteria.
Cecil Clayton's case may not be the best example to illustrate the
divergence between moral and criminal responsibility criteria, but
it demonstrates the possibility of such cases.
II. TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Let us now examine the different interpretations of the claim by
Clayton's attorney that he was blameless, not a responsible agent
when he committed murder.
A. It Was His Brain, Not Him
The first seemingly commonsense reason to find Clayton less
than fully responsible is that his brain injury-not him-caused his
terrible wrongdoing. After all, from all accounts of Clayton, there
was no reason to believe he would commit homicide before the
sawmill accident. Given that he was not responsible for the sawmill
accident, so the argument goes, we should blame Clayton's altered
biology for his crime, not him.13
The problem with this argument is that it assumes that conduct
for which we can be held responsible is caused by an agent yet some-
how not caused by her brain. That assumption is, of course, false.
All of our conduct is caused by our brains. The fact that we can, at
least in principle, causally explain conduct by reference to one's
brain structure and chemistry does not imply that we cannot also
explain conduct from a different perspective, by reference to one's
decisions, choices, intentions, beliefs, and other psychological phe-
nomena.1 4 I decided to write this paper because I believe I have
multiple reasons to write it. Neural correlates surely underlie the
facts of decision and the existence of my thoughts and beliefs, but
the existence of those neural correlates does not imply that the ex-
planatory account in terms of my psychology is illusory. One might
disagree, maintaining that mental states are illusory;15 but on that
view, it would be senseless to ask the question with which we began
(i.e., should we attribute the conduct to the agent's brain or to the
13. David Eagleman, The Brain on Trial, THE ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/07/the-brain-on-trial/308520/ (asserting
that juries are not faced with the question, "Was it [the defendant's] fault, or his biology's
fault" though that is the wrong question).
14. Stephen J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 Geo. L.J. 527, 528-29 (1996).
15. See, e.g., William Ramsey, Eliminative Materialism, THE STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL. (May 2013), https://plato.stanford.edulentries/materialism-eliminative/#ConEliMat;
Morse, supra note 14, at 528.
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agent, where the latter implies actions based on choices, intentions,
desires, etc.). If there are no mental states, then there is no sense
in which any agent is responsible for a choice or act. There is no
point in distinguishing the responsible from the non-responsible
unless at least some agents are responsible for their conduct and
attitudes.
B. His Brain Injury Causally Determined His Wrongdoing
One might argue, however, that even if Clayton's conduct was
caused by his mental states, he is not responsible if he could not
have had different mental states. In other words, so the argument
goes, even if he made a decision to act in wrongful ways, his decision
was causally determined by facts outside his control; namely, the
accident and the injury it caused to his brain. This argument is
based on the intuition that responsibility requires free will, and free
will requires the capacity to choose among genuine alternatives.
One might acknowledge that Clayton made choices but wonder,
upon learning about the severity of his brain injuries, whether he
really could have made different choices than the ones he did. The
philosophical view underlying this argument is incompatibilism:
that being causally determined by forces outside one's control is in-
compatible with free will and/or fair ascriptions of responsibility.
The criminal law does not accept incompatibilism in that its cri-
teria for responsibility do not include freedom from causal determi-
nation. Stephen Morse and Michael Moore have demonstrated16
that the criminal law is "officially compatibilist,"17 meaning persons
can meet the criminal law's criteria for responsibility even if forces
outside our control causally determine all our actions and choices.
In other words, whether Clayton's brain injury, accident, or other
forces outside his control causally determined his wrongdoing is ir-
relevant to assessing his responsibility status under law.
To understand the compatibility of criminal responsibility and
causal determination, let us briefly turn to insanity standards. In-
sanity standards represent the criminal law's conception of what it
means to be an agent who may fairly be held responsible for wrong-
doing. Of the forty-six states that have the defense, most have a
16. MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 523-
37 (1997); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual
Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 347 (1998).
17. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON 1775, 1776 (2004).
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purely cognitive test, focusing on the beliefs of the defendant.1 8 The
M'Naghten test, which is most widely used in one form or another,
directs a jury to acquit if, at the time of the crime, "the party ac-
cused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing, or as not to know that what he was doing was wrong."19 The
first prong of the Model Penal Code rule, adopted in other states,
also represents a cognitive standard: an accused is not responsible
for a crime if, due to a mental disease or defect, he lacked "substan-
tial capacity . .. to appreciate" the wrongfulness of his conduct.20 In
essence, given that the law provides rules and considerations to
guide our conduct, it presumes there are persons who have the ca-
pacity to consider the law when reasoning about what to do.2 1 A
person who does not know or sufficiently appreciate the nature of
his conduct or know the legally or morally relevant features of his
circumstances lacks sufficient rational capacity to be considered a
legally responsible agent.
Notice that possessing knowledge, appreciating right versus
wrong, and being able to reason practically about what one is doing
are perfectly compatible with being caused to act by events outside
one's control. To see that fact, let us stipulate the truth of causal
determinism, which is, "roughly speaking, the idea that every
event[, including each human choice and action,] is necessitated by
antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of na-
ture."22 Even if my sitting here typing was causally determined by
forces outside my control-including my genes, my upbringing, all
laws of physics, etc.-I still understand the nature of what I am
doing. Even if all our choices and actions are caused by such forces
outside our control, the overwhelming majority of adult persons
possess the capacity to know what they are doing, to appreciate
right versus wrong, and to reason practically about what to do. The
law does not excuse for being caused; it excuses for severe psycho-
logical impairments that undermine rationality. Accordingly, if
18. The insanity standards of approximately seventeen states include a volitional prong.
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 751 (2006).
19. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 208 (1843), 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
20. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Am. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). The
actual language of the standard would excuse a defendant for failing to appreciate the crim-
inality or wrongfulness of his conduct, depending on which term the adopting state legisla-
ture chose to put into the standard.
21. Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
15, 18 (1997); Morse, supra note 16, at 339.




Clayton or other sufferers of severe TBI are less than fully respon-
sible agents, it is not because their brain injury, per se, causes their
conduct. Rationality impairments caused by brain injuries, if suffi-
ciently severe, undermine or diminish one's status as a responsible
agent.
The criminal law in some American jurisdictions also permits an
insanity defense for individuals who suffered a severe volitional im-
pairment at the time of their crime. That is, in these jurisdictions,
the law excuses individuals who might have known the nature and
wrongness of their actions but who lacked sufficient capacity to con-
trol themselves. New Mexico, for example, states that "'if, by reason
of disease of the mind, [a] defendant has been deprived of or lost the
power of his will which would enable him to prevent himself from
doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty."2 3 A person suffering
from kleptomania might argue that though she knew she was
wrongfully committing theft, she could not resist the urge to steal.
Non-responsibility under a volitional insanity test requires more
than showing that one's conduct was caused by one's brain injury.
Let us stipulate that Clayton's brain injury was a cause of his fail-
ure to resist his impulse to kill his victim. That stipulated fact, by
itself, would not be sufficient to conclude Clayton was not a respon-
sible agent at the time of his crime. The fact that an agent's brain
injury caused one's failure to control himself does not show, by it-
self, that the agent lacked sufficient capacity to control himself. Un-
der existing law, to determine whether an agent could have con-
trolled himself-whether he could have done otherwise-a fact-
finder should ask whether the agent would have done otherwise if
certain facts had been true.2 4 That is, the factfinder must contem-
plate counterfactual circumstances that are closely similar but im-
portantly different from the actual circumstances in which the
agent acted.25 The "policeman at the elbow" test is illustrative. A
factfinder might ask if the person with kleptomania would have
still stolen the shirt in similar circumstances with one crucial fact
different: A police officer stood nearby.2 6 If the defendant would
23. State v. Hartley, 565 P.2d 658, 660 (N.M. 1977) (quoting State v. White, 270 P.2d
727, 730 (N.M. 1954)).
24. Michael S. Moore, The Neuroscience of Volitional Excuse, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 179-230 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2016) (emphasis
added).
25. Paul Litton, The Mistaken Question for a Control Test: For a Rationality Standard of
Sanity, in THE INSANITY DEFENSE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY VIEWS ON ITS HISTORY, TRENDS, AND
CONTROVERSIES 185, 194-95 (Mark D. White ed., 2017).
26. See, e.g., State v. Forrest, 578 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 1990); People v. Jackson, 627 N.W.2d
11 (Mich. App. 2001); State v. Wood, No. 58437, 1991 WL 76041, at *4 (Ohio App. May 9,
42 Vol. 56
TBI and Responsibility
have still stolen the shirt despite high chance of arrest, a factfinder
might conclude that he lacked sufficient capacity to resist his patho-
logical urge to steal.
Take note that in assessing whether a defendant had sufficient
volitional capacity for responsibility, we do not ask whether he
could have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances. If
every single fact from his brain structure and chemistry to his ex-
ternal situation were exactly the same, there is no reason to think
he would have taken any different course of action. In asking
whether the defendant would have done otherwise under different
circumstances, we are trying to assess his capacity to react to the
recognition of reasons. Whether a defendant has that capacity to
react to the recognition of reasons-to conform his will to his judg-
ment about what he has reason to do-is independent of whether
he was caused to act by forces outside his control. Once again, we
see that a legal standard that helps define the criminal law's con-
ception of responsibility does not support the idea that an agent is
less than fully responsible if his wrongdoing was caused by forces
outside his control. If Clayton or other victims of a severe TBI are
less than fully responsible for a wrongful act, it must be for impair-
ments to their cognitive and volitional capacities, the topics to
which we now turn.
C. His Brain Injury Diminished His Capacity for Rationality
As evident by previous discussion, we now have encountered our
first legally sound interpretation of Clayton's attorney's claim, re-
gardless of whether it was persuasive on the facts of his case. That
interpretation is that Clayton's brain injury impaired his psycho-
logical functioning in ways that diminished his capacity for ration-
ality and, thus, his status as a responsible agent. "Although the
language for each insanity standard offers the potential for mental
defect as the res result of some neurologically based injury, research
suggests the majority of individuals who pursue an insanity de-
fense, or who are acquitted using this defense, have a major mental
illness such as schizophrenia, another psychosis, or a major affec-
tive disorder."27 Although in some very rare cases the cognitive im-
pairments from TBI can rise to the level of insanity, the effects are
1991) ("While we concede the 'policeman-at-the-elbow' test is not recognized as a valid test
for insanity in Ohio, . . . it is directly probative of defendant's ability to refrain.").
27. Kathy F. Yates & Robert L. Denney, Neuropsychology in the Assessment of Mental
State, in CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY IN THE CRIMINAL FORENSIC SETTING 224 (Robert L.
Denney & James P. Sullivan eds., 2008) (citing Paul G. Nestor & Joel Haycock, Not Guilty
by Reason of Insanity for Murder: Clinical and Neuropsychological Characteristics, 25 J. Am.
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more often relevant to a judgment of diminished responsibility,
which is relevant in mitigation at sentencing.28
Indeed, Clayton's defense urged arguments along these lines. His
experts testified not merely that Clayton failed to deliberate before
committing murder, but that he was "not capable of 'coolly reflect-
ing .... when agitated."'29 They further testified that his inculpatory
statements were not trustworthy because Clayton was "unusually
'susceptible to suggestion,"'3 0 implying that his perception of reality
was distorted. According to medical examinations from the late
1970s and early 1980s, Clayton "hallucinated strangers and heard
voices and noises such as drawers opening and closing."31 He expe-
rienced "severe anxiety around people"32 and "developed paranoid
delusions."33
Clayton's counsel made related arguments, not to show his lack
of responsibility for his crime, but to show that he was incompetent
to proceed and for execution. One expert asserted Clayton "lack[ed]
the capacity . . . to make rational decisions regarding his habeas
proceedings";3 4 another testified that Clayton was delusional as to
whether he committed the crime and whether the state would exe-
cute him. Again, regardless of whether these cognitive impair-
ments were sufficiently severe to diminish his status as a responsi-
ble agent, it is these kinds of deficits that are relevant to responsi-
bility, not the fact that his accident and brain injury caused them.
Beyond Clayton's case, a TBI can cause cognitive impairments
that can diminish or eliminate one's status as a responsible agent,
depending on the severity and location of the injury. Injuries to the
frontal lobe can impair "the ability to focus attention to appropriate
stimuli, organize and plan, problem-solve, formulate good decisions,
and exhibit appropriate judgment."35 It can also diminish one's
ACAM. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 161 (1997) and HENRY J. STEAMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER
HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM (1993)).
28. Id. at 228-29.
29. State ex rel. Clayton v. Griffith, 457 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Mo. 2015).
30. Id.
31. Sean D. O'Brien, Traumatic Brain Injury and the Law: Introduction, 84 UMKC L.
Rev. 287, 288-89 (2015) (citing Report of George Klinkerfuss, M.D., Jul. 16, 1980 (on file with
O'Brien)).
32. Id. at 288 (citing Report of George Klinkerfuss, M.D., Jan. 30, 1978 (on file with
O'Brien)).
33. Id. at 289 (citing Report of William F. Clary, M.D., Jan. 24, 1979 (on file with
O'Brien)).
34. Clayton, 457 S.W.3d at 746.





"ability to empathize with others,"36 which can impact one's ability
to distinguish right from wrong. Damage to temporal lobes can di-
minish one's capacity to form and store new memories,37 which also
has implications for an agent's understanding of the nature of his
conduct and his circumstances. Psychosis (which involves "some
loss of contact with reality"3 8) and anxiety are also "well-known se-
quelae of TBI." 39 Again, these sorts of cognitive impairments are
relevant to assessing an agent's responsibility status.
Cognitive impairments caused by TBI may be severe enough such
that we might conclude the agent should not be held responsible for
wrongdoing or other socially inappropriate behavior. One docu-
mented effect of some TBIs is behavioral disinhibition.40 Disinhibi-
tion might involve impulsivity, which perhaps is more relevant to
volitional impairments; however, it can also involve an inability to
recognize social inappropriateness. Some victims of a TBI behave
sexually at inappropriate times or occasions, such as masturbating
in public without realizing it violates social norms, not to mention
legal rules.41 Such an offender would be non-responsible for failing
to understand the wrongness of his behavior.
William Winslade provides another example of an individual
whose TBI, suffered during a near-fatal car accident, caused the
kinds of cognitive deficits that undermine responsibility. After the
accident, he became increasingly suspicious and delusional. He
formed an overwhelming paranoid delusion that his mother, with
whom he had previously had a good relationship, had become part
of a conspiracy to kill his father. One day he was at the drugstore
with his mother when she was picking up some cardiac medication
(coumadin) for his father. The pharmacist said to her jokingly,
"What are you going to do with all this rat poison?" The young
36. Id.
37. Id.; Larry R. Squire, Craig E.L. Stark & Robert E. Clark, The Medial Temporal Lobe,
27 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 279 (2004); Stacey Wood & Bhushan S. Agharkar, Traumatic
Brain Injury in Criminal Litigation, 84 UMKC L. REV. 411, 415 (2015).
38. What Is Psychosis, NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH,
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/schizophrenia/raise/what-is-psychosis.shtml (last
visited Oct. 21, 2017).
39. Wood & Agharkar, supra note 37, at 415 (citing Edward Kim et al., Neuropsychiatric
Complications of Traumatic Brain Injury: A Critical Review of the Literature, 19 J.
NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 2, 114 (2007)).
40. Marcelo Schwarzbold et al., Psychiatric Disorders and Traumatic Brain Injury, 4
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 797, 809 (2008).
41. Gov't of Victoria, Austl., Brain Injury and Sexual Issues, https://www.bet-
terhealth.vic.gov.au/health/conditionsandtreatments/brain-injury-and-sexual-issues (last
updated Apr. 2013); see also Glenn Kelly & Grahame Simpson, Remediating Serious Inap-




man's paranoid delusion about the conspiracy intensified and he
felt compelled to kill his mother to protect his father. When he and
his mother got home, he shot her to death. The psychiatrists who
evaluated the young man all agreed, as did the attorneys, that he
was insane because they thought he was a paranoid schizophrenic.
Although it was clear that he was legally insane, after he was com-
mitted to a mental institution, it was discovered he was not suffer-
ing from schizophrenia. Only later did his physicians realize that
his traumatic brain injury rather than schizophrenia caused his
paranoia.42
The impairments caused by this individual's injury were suffi-
cient to undermine completely his status as a responsible agent, ac-
cording to his psychiatrists. However, in another individual case,
cognitive impairments could be serious but not quite as severe such
that the agent should be considered partially responsible. Cogni-
tive impairments that diminish but do not completely undermine
responsibility are relevant to sentencing and other criminal law
doctrines .43 Indeed, although TBI-related cognitive impairments
can rise to the level of insanity in the very rare case, the effects are
more often relevant to a judgment of diminished responsibility, rel-
evant in mitigation at sentencing.44 With a less serious injury, the
impairments might not diminish the agent's status at all. The crit-
ical point is that these kinds of psychological impairments are rele-
vant to responsibility because they can undermine an agent's ca-
pacity for practical rationality.
D. His Brain Injury Caused a Severe Volitional Impairment
Traumatic brain injury, particularly to the frontal lobes, can have
severely negative consequences for an individual's ability to control
impulses.45 Clayton's brother testified that Clayton, after losing
42. William J. Winslade, Traumatic Brain Injury and Criminal Responsibility, 10 MED.
ETHICS 4 (2003), reprinted in LAW.UH.EDU, http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspec-
tives/Disabilities/031215Traumatic.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2017).
43. As Stephen Morse points out, American criminal law does not include a generic par-
tial responsibility doctrine. However, one could interpret voluntary manslaughter doctrine
as providing a partial responsibility doctrine that reduces "a homicide that would otherwise
be murder to manslaughter." Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Re-
sponsibility, 1 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 289 (2003). The Model Penal Code's take on volun-
tary manslaughter, employing the "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" standard,
seems to represent clearly a partial excuse based on psychological impairment.
44. Yates & Denney, supra note 27, at 228-29.
45. Wood & Agharkar, supra note 37, at 417 (citing Harold V. Hall, Criminal-Forensic
Neuropsychology of Disorders of Executive Functions, in DISORDERS OF EXECUTIVE




20% of his frontal lobe, "became impatient, unable to work, and
more prone to violent outbursts."4 6 In insanity cases and capital
sentencing trials, mental health experts regularly testify that
frontal lobe damage suffered by the defendant led to impulse control
difficulties and disinhibition.4 7
Whether insanity standards should include a volitional prong is
controversial, as evidenced by the fact that a minority of states per-
mit an insanity acquittal based on an impulse control problem.4 8
There is good reason to conclude that insanity standards should
only include a cognitive prong.49 Furthermore, if Clayton's attor-
ney's assertion that he was blameless was based on the premise
that he lacked volitional capacity, the claim is probably doubtful.
Thirty minutes after he killed Deputy Castetter, two officers ap-
peared at Clayton's home to question him. He asked his friend
whether he should shoot them; after his friend said, "No," Clayton
did not.5 0
Nonetheless, regardless of Clayton's case or whether insanity
standards should include a volitional prong, volitional control im-
pairments should be considered mitigating at sentencing. Respon-
sibility status comes in degrees. Even if a minimal capacity for self-
control should be the threshold for criminal liability, one's respon-
sibility status may be diminished due to volitional or cognitive im-
pairments relative to agents without such psychological dysfunc-
tion. Thus, the main point here is that we have a second plausible
interpretation of Clayton's attorney's claim: His frontal lobe dam-
age diminished his capacity to control impulses, and despite his
awareness of the nature of his conduct, his capacity to control his
impulses was too diminished to hold him responsible. We can dis-
agree with her conclusion that Clayton was not fully responsible yet
46. State ex rel. Clayton v. Griffith, 457 S.W.3d 735, 737 (Mo. 2015).
47. See, e.g., Hoskins v. State, 75 So. 3d 250, 254 (Fla. 2011) ("[T]hree experts testified
that [defendant] had a frontal lobe impairment and that as a result [he] had difficulty con-
trolling his impulses."); Crook v. State, 813 So. 3d 68, 70-71 (Fla. 2002) (neurologist links
defendant's impulse control disorder and frontal lobe damage); Hall v. Lance, 286 Ga. 365,
370-71 (2010) (neuropsychologist estifies that persons with frontal lobe dysfunction "are
more often 'involved in crimes of impulse."'); State v. Thompson, No. 02631, 2003 WL
22018899, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (expert concluded damage to frontal lobe diminished
defendant's "ability to delay and inhibit impulsive reactions on the day of the alleged crime").
See also People v. Holland, 32 Misc. 3d 926, 928 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 2011) (in sex offender classifi-
cation case, government argues that brain injury caused registrant to have poor impulse
control).
48. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 751 (2006).
49. Stephen J. Morse, Against Control Tests for Criminal Responsibility, in CRIMINAL
LAW CONVERSATIONS 449 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
eds., 2009); see also Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L.
REV. 1025 (2002); Litton, supra note 25, at 185.
50. Clayton, 457 S.W.3d at 737.
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agree that he was less than fully responsible if his capacity to con-
trol his impulses was, in fact, seriously diminished by his traumatic
brain injury.
III. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PERSONALITY CHANGE
One interpretation remains of the claim that Clayton was blame-
less due to his TBI: The agent who committed the homicide was not
the real Clayton. Due to his brain injury, his personality changed
so drastically that the person post-injury was no longer Clayton.
This interpretation is distinct from the first; it is not the claim that
it was his brain or altered biology. Rather, the claim is that the
agent who acted was not truly Clayton. The basis for the claim is
the scientific research that shows many victims of TBI "develop sig-
nificant changes in character traits."5 1
The law does not recognize significant personality change, by it-
self, as an excuse. A sentencing judge or juror may consider the
extent to which she believes an offender's crime reflected her true
self, but no legal standard explicitly incorporates a correlating cri-
terion of responsibility. In fact, empirical research suggests that
our intuitions about moral responsibility respond to beliefs as to
whether an action reflected an agent's "true self."52 Within our eve-
ryday moral experience of blaming ourselves and others for moral
infractions, we do consider whether an act truly reflects attitudes
and character traits attributable to the actor in question.
Let us begin by understanding the significance of moral blame,
specifically with respect to judgments that an agent has wronged
another person. Moral blame seems to have some social signifi-
cance apart from an associated judgment that a person or group has
violated an obligation owed to someone. In Susan Wolf s words, to
blame someone for moral wrongdoing is to judge the "moral quality
of the individual herself . .. [in a] seemingly more serious way" than
judging her for some other kind of failing.53
T.M. Scanlon offers a persuasive account of blame's signifi-
cance.54 Blaming judgments respond to the perception that another
51. Edward Kim, Agitation, Aggression, and Disinhibition Syndromes after Traumatic
Brain Injury, 17 NEUROREHABILITATION 297, 298 (2002).
52. See, e.g., George E. Newman, Julian De Freitas & Joshua Knobe, Beliefs About the
True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment, 39 COGNITIVE SCIENCE 96 (2015)
(arguing that data show that we think "deep inside every individual is a 'true self moving
her to behave in morally virtuous ways, and this belief, in turn, 'causes people to hold differ-
ent intuitions about . . . whether . .. she deserves praise or blame"').
53. SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 41 (1989).
54. See T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS 122-60 (2008); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE
OWE To EACH OTHER 267-77 (1998).
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has expressed ill will or inappropriate indifference toward the value
of another person or persons.5 5 Moral blame, then, has a different
kind of significance for interpersonal relations than other kinds of
criticisms. If you fail to see the value of music or chess, and if I care
deeply about them, then perhaps limitations exist on the kinds of
relationship we might have; but even if we do not share common
interests, many good relationships remain possible. We "can still
be . .. good neighbor[s], co-worker[s], or even friend[s]."5 6 However,
if I hold you responsible for conduct that exhibits disrespectful atti-
tudes toward me as a person, then my blaming you has a deeper
significance; the implications are more severe. If your attitudes to-
ward me are completely disrespectful of my value as a person, then
I should not see reason to have any kind of meaningful relationship
with you. Scanlon's insight about blame, more generally, is that to
judge someone blameworthy is to claim that "something about [her]
attitudes toward others . . . impairs the relations that others can
have with [her] ."'
Thus, morality is concerned not merely with blameworthy and
praiseworthy acts but also with the attitudes agents hold toward
others. Specifically, it is concerned with attitudes that are sensitive
to reasoned judgments. To illustrate, most of us do and should mor-
ally blame persons who view others with contempt based on sex,
race, or other demographic categories. Even if you do not act on
your contempt for me based on race, your attitudes are still blame-
worthy in that it is appropriate for me to take them as an impair-
ment to our relations. Moreover, your attitudes that impair our re-
lations are sensitive to reasoned judgment, unlike, say, your sexual
orientation or height. It could be sensible for me to demand a jus-
tification in terms of reasons for your attitude or, in the alternative,
an explanation or excuse.
We blame an agent for an action or attitude only when that action
or attitude is "attributable to the agent."5 8 An act or attitude is
attributable to an agent not merely because it is causally attribut-
able to his biology. An intention caused by another agent directly
stimulating my brain or by hypnosis would not be mine, even if I
experienced it. It would be inappropriate to demand that I justify
the intention given that it did not spring from my own attitudes
55. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 54 at 128 (relying on Peter Strawson,
Freedom and Resentment, in xlviii PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY 1-25 (1962), re-
printed in FREE WILL 59-80 (Gary Watson ed., 1982)).
56. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 54 at 159.
57. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 54, at 128.
58. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 54, at 277.
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amenable to practical reasoning.59 As Scanlon argues, to be an
agent whom we may hold responsible-to be a "rational creature"-
is a matter of having a coherent psychology of a certain kind: of
there being the right kind of stable and coherent connections
between what one says, does, and how things seem to one at
one time, and what one says, does, and how things seem to one
at later times. This coherence is not merely a matter of the
judgments a creature makes, but also of what occurs to it and
how things seem to it (what strikes is as relevant to a given
question, for example). .. . What distinguishes cases like hyp-
nosis and brain stimulation is thus not that they involve causal
influences but rather the fact that these causal influences are of
a kind that sever the connection between the action or attitude
and the agent's judgments and character.6 0
Notice an implication of Scanlon's observation. Imagine an evil
scientist secretly manipulates my brain in a way that causes me to
form the belief that I should insult my friend who happens to be
standing nearby.61 This belief is already normative in that I expe-
rience the thought "I should insult my friend"; moreover, I do not
reevaluate it. I form the intention and act on it. I did not suffer a
hallucination or delusion about empirical reality: I understood the
nature of my action. I retained the capacity to recognize that it was
wrong. And let us stipulate that I could have refrained from insult-
ing my friend in the sense that had I seen a reason to refrain, I
would have. In other words, I was sane; I met the criminal law's
criteria for responsibility. Nevertheless, I have a moral excuse. The
belief did not arise from my own stable judgment-sensitive atti-
tudes. The scientist's direct manipulation of my brain "sever[ed]
the connection" between the intention on which I acted and my at-
titudes and character.62 Perhaps there was a moment during which
I could have re-evaluated the belief; nevertheless, my friend does
not have reason to believe that the insult reflects any blameworthy
attitude of mine that should impair our relations. Her response
might be, "That wasn't you."
So now we are in a position to see another way in which a trau-
matic brain injury might undermine moral responsibility. Let us
start with Scanlon's example:
59. Id.
60. Id. at 278.
61. This example is based on Scanlon's discussions: Id. at 278-79; SCANLON, MORAL
DIMENSIONS, supra note 54, at 129.
62. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 54 at 278.
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Suppose ... that someone who has previously always been kind
and considerate suddenly begins making cruel and wounding
remarks to her friends after being hit on the head or given
drugs for some medical condition. We would not, at least at
first, take this behavior as grounds for modifying our opinion
of her. The injury or drugs constitute a break . .. block[ing] the
attribution of these actions to the person we have always
known.63
The brain injury, in his example, severed the connection between
the way the agent normally sees the world and the way in which he
is temporarily experiencing it. Put differently, in light of his stable
characteristics, the agent normally does not see reason to make
cruel remarks; however, he now, temporarily, experiences the sense
that he has reason to make these remarks. He has an excuse be-
cause the fact that he sees reason to be cruel was not rooted in his
judgment-sensitive attitudes or his character. Now, if the agent
does not revert back-if his "old self' does not reappear-then at
some point he no longer has the excuse. If his cruelty continues,
then we would say that he has changed and owns these disrespect-
ful actions and attitudes.64
Therefore, a significant personality change, at least for some fi-
nite period of time, can represent reason to excuse an agent for
wrongdoing. Though controversial, much of the psychological liter-
ature on TBI suggests that some agents, depending on the injury,
experience personality changes.6 5 The Phineas Gage story surely
comes to mind, as "friends and acquaintances aid he was 'no longer
Gage' after his accident.6 6 Even if the changes to Gage's personal-
ity are the substance of myth,6 7 "marked personality changes and
63. Id. at 278-79.
64. Id.
65. Wood & Agharkar, supra note 36, at 415 (citing Edward Kim et al., Neuropsychiatric
Complications of Traumatic Brain Injury: A Critical Review of the Literature, 19 J.
NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 2, 107 (2007) ("[Plersonality changes are a
well-known sequelae of TBI.")).
66. Kieran O'Driscoll & John Paul Leach, 'No Longer Gage: An Iron Bar Through the
Head: Early Observations of Personality Change After Injury to the Prefrontal Cortex, 317
BRIT. MED. J. 1673, 1673-74 (1998) (citing John Martin Harlow, Recovery from the Passage of
an Iron Bar through the Head, 2 PUBL. MED. MASS. Soc. 327 (1868)).
67. Sam Kean, Phineas Gage, Neuroscience's Most Famous Patient, SLATECOM (May 6,
2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/healthandscience/science/2014/05/phineas-gage neu-
rosciencecasetrue-story of famousfrontal lobe patient.html.
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deviant social behavior in premorbidly normal individuals have fre-
quently been noted in cases following damage to the prefrontal re-
gion."68
Researchers have documented several kinds of personality
changes in victims of a TBI. One prevalent diagnosis is apathy,
sometimes but not always associated with depressive symptoms. 6 9
On one definition of "apathy," it entails a "lack of motivation, that
is, loss of motivation that is not attributable to emotional distress,
intellectual impairment, or diminished consciousness."To It seems,
based on common sense, that apathy can lead to moral failures. A
person suffering from apathy might ignore or fail to recognize the
fact that a friend is in need. Lacking motivation to listen intently
to others, she may fail to react properly to someone's pain or to show
a family member or friend appropriate concern in a time of need.
Now imagine someone who suffers from apathy due to a TBI alt-
hough she was, before the accident, very attentive to the needs of
others. If we were unaware of her TBI, we might blame her for
negligence toward her friends and family; certainly, they would see
her negligence as impairing their relations. However, upon learn-
ing of her brain injury, we likely will see her personality change as
excusing, at least for a certain period. We might say, "She is really
not herself. This is not her. The friend who I know really cares." I
emphasize here that this excuse is plausible even if the agent un-
derstands the nature of her actions-she is in touch with reality in
that she might know she is ignoring the needs of others-and is not
suffering from a volitional incapacity or loss of self-control.
Other studies show that some TBI victims show an increase in
aggressive behavior and irritability.71 Aggressive behavior, of
course, can represent moral failure in itself. It can involve verbal
or physical threats or abuse. Irritability can lead to moral trans-
gressions. It can cause adults to mistreat children and spouses; it
can cause rude and impatient behavior toward other persons.
Again, aggressiveness and irritability might represent a change in
personality and, thus, on that basis, be excused at least for a limited
duration.
68. Joseph Barrash, Daniel Tranel & Steven W. Anderson, Acquired Personality Disturb-
ances Associated with Bilateral Damage to the Ventromedial Prefrontal Region, 18
DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOL. 355, 356 (2000) (citing multiple sources).
69. Marcelo Schwarzbold et al., Psychiatric Disorders and Traumatic Brain Injury, 4
NEUROPSYCHOL. DISEASE & TREATMENT 797, 807 (2008).
70. Junko Ishizaki & Masaru Mimura, Dysthymia and Apathy: Diagnosis and Treat-
ment, 2011 DEPRESSION RESEARCH & TREATMENT, at 2, 4, https://www.hindawi.com/jour-
nals/drt/2011/893905/.
71. Schwarzbold et al., supra note 69, at 808.
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One might reasonably point out here that TBI-related aggressive
behavior and negative conduct caused by irritability is most often
impulsive, not premeditated. Insofar as the behavior is excusable,
one might argue, the basis of the excuse is a volitional impairment,
not personality change. In other words, one might argue that in-
stances of TBI-related aggression or irritable behavior might be ex-
cusable, but the reason is that such victims of TBI lose the ability
to control themselves, especially when they suffered injury to their
prefrontal cortex. Personality change might not represent an inde-
pendent basis of excuse. It seems clear that it is very difficult, at
the least, to distinguish a personality change from volitional, as
well as from cognitive, impairments. Cases in the literature regard-
ing personality changes from brain injuries do also seem to involve
cognitive impairments and diminished capacities for self-control.
Indeed, a neuropsychologist would not look for a personality change
in a patient except for personality changes that affect psychological
functioning.72
Nevertheless, it is a mistake not to see severe personality change
as a distinct basis for moral excuse. Recall the individual stricken
with serious apathy following a brain injury. Acting contrary to her
pre-injury self, she might fail to react empathetically to a friend's
pain or her appropriate concern in a time of need. Her ignoring her
friend does not have to involve a failure to resist any impulse. She
might also understand very well that her lack of attention to her
friend displays a lack of caring. An excuse from moral blame seems
appropriate, especially if she recovers from her injury and reverts
to her old caring self. There may even be cases in which an agent
did, in fact, fail to control an impulse but nevertheless should be
excused from moral blame if her wrongdoing does not reflect long-
standing, stable, judgement- sensitive attitudes. Perhaps the
agent's TBI did diminish her ability to control her negative im-
pulses; that fact does not imply that the individual lacks sufficient
volitional capacity to be held responsible to some degree. Perhaps
her volitional impairment, by itself, justifies a finding of partial re-
sponsibility. But if her conduct was due to a temporary and extreme
personality change such that her wrongdoing is not attributable to
her pre-injury and post-recovery attitudes, then a full excuse may
be warranted.
72. Interview with Christopher J. Graver, Ph.D., Chief, Neuropsychology Service, Madi-
gan Army Medical Center (Aug. 17, 2017).
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This reflection on TBI-related personality changes reveals a
slight divergence between criteria of moral responsibility and ex-
plicit requirements of criminal responsibility. Certainly, a criminal
defendant may argue at sentencing that a criminal act did not re-
ally represent his true self, that a brain injury caused a personality
change from which he can recover. But while a defendant may pre-
sent that argument at sentencing, a significant personality change
cannot undermine criminal responsibility altogether independent
of any severe cognitive or volitional impairment.
Acknowledging the divergence between the criteria for moral and
criminal responsibility does not imply that the law should change.
The law cannot recognize such a full excuse based on personality
change. Some of the reasons are associated with why some charac-
ter-based theories of the excuses are not persuasive. It is just not
feasible to assess an individual's character traits held and ex-
pressed throughout his life and discern the extent to which the act
in question reflects such traits. Specifically, with respect to TBI
cases, we would run into such difficulties in trying to discern the
extent to which some instance of wrongdoing is due to a personality
change. For one, individual resilience to the effects of a TBI varies
from person to person. Imagine two persons who suffer the same
TBI, and their TBIs are responsible for weakening their ability to
resist impulses to the same extent. However, imagine one of them,
pre-injury, had greater strength of will, and was able to resist anti-
social impulses even after the injury. If the second agent, who pre-
injury was more weak-willed but nevertheless conformed to the law,
succumbed to antisocial impulses post-injury, would it be appropri-
ate to conclude that his crime was due to a personality change? It
is just impossible to answer.
This obstacle is particularly salient in the TBI context. Some of
the factors that put someone at risk of suffering a TBI mirror some
characteristic effects of suffering one. That is, while we have seen
that TBI can cause cognitive impairments and other symptoms as-
sociated with mental illness, low cognition and psychiatric illness
are also causes of suffering a TBI. 7 3 At the same time, persons tend
to underestimate their cognitive impairments and deficits pre-in-
jury. In other words, a person might have had some cognitive im-
pairment before injury of which she was unaware and which actu-
ally contributed to the suffering of the injury; however, she then
73. Christopher Graver, Traumatic Brain Injury 2.0: The Science, Treatment and Legal
Considerations Behind One of Our Nation's Most Pressing Issues, YOUTUBE (Nov. 11, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mxRHtOGC-fE (Keynote Presentation - TBI: The Tip of
the Iceberg streamed live as part of the Missouri Law Review Symposium 2016).
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may realize post-injury that she does have a particular impairment,
but she will incorrectly attribute it to the TBI. These empirical
findings regarding victims of TBI make it especially difficult to dis-
cern whether some wrongful act was caused by a personality
change, which was, in turn, caused by the injury.
Second, the sort of acts punishable under the law are generally
more serious in terms of harm caused. We must demand very high
levels of self-control of persons when it comes to the kinds of conduct
prohibited by the criminal law. In fact, in my view, the fact that
the law must demand very high levels of self-control is the main
reason why the law should not recognize volitional impairment as
a basis for a successful insanity plea. It is also why the law cannot
recognize any full excuse based on personality change or the fact
that a wrongful act does not reflect an agent's longstanding atti-
tudes or "true self." The law cannot provide individuals with an
incentive to commit a "one off' wrongful act. With respect to any
defense that would completely exempt an individual from criminal
responsibility, the law should maintain its focus on cognitive and
rationality impairments.
IV. CONCLUSION
Traumatic brain injury can render an individual blameless under
criterion for moral and criminal responsibility. It is important,
however, to understand how a traumatic brain injury may be rele-
vant to an individual's responsibility status. The fact that an indi-
vidual would not have committed a crime but for a brain injury is
not sufficient to undermine or even diminish her status as a fully
accountable agent. What matters are the psychological effects of
the TBI: Did it cause cognitive impairments undermining or dimin-
ishing the individual's capacity for practical reasoning? Did it cause
a volitional impairment, meaning he could not control himself and
act in accordance with his judgment? While cognitive and volitional
capacities are xplicitly articulated in law as criteria of responsibil-
ity, reflection on TBI cases highlights a criterion of moral responsi-
bility not explicitly provided in the criminal law: Did the TBI cause
such a severe personality change in the offender that it is appropri-
ate to excuse him because his conduct did not truly reflect his atti-
tudes toward others?
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